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Abstract
We present HotStu, a leader-based Byzantine fault-tolerant replication protocol for the partially synchronous
model. Once network communication becomes synchronous, HotStu enables a correct leader to drive the pro-
tocol to consensus at the pace of actual (vs. maximum) network delay—a property called responsiveness—and with
communication complexity that is linear in the number of replicas. To our knowledge, HotStu is the rst par-
tially synchronous BFT replication protocol exhibiting these combined properties. HotStu is built around a novel
framework that forms a bridge between classical BFT foundations and blockchains. It allows the expression of other
known protocols (DLS, PBFT, Tendermint, Casper), and ours, in a common framework.
Our deployment of HotStu over a network with over 100 replicas achieves throughput and latency comparable
to that of BFT-SMaRt, while enjoying linear communication footprint during leader failover (vs. cubic with BFT-
SMaRt).
1 Introduction
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) refers to the ability of a computing system to endure arbitrary (i.e., Byzantine) failures
of its components while taking actions critical to the system’s operation. In the context of state machine replication
(SMR) [35, 47], the system as a whole provides a replicated service whose state is mirrored across n deterministic
replicas. A BFT SMR protocol is used to ensure that non-faulty replicas agree on an order of execution for client-
initiated service commands, despite the eorts of f Byzantine replicas. This, in turn, ensures that then−f non-faulty
replicas will run commands identically and so produce the same response for each command. As is common, we are
concerned here with the partially synchronous communication model [25], whereby a known bound ∆ on message
transmission holds after some unknown global stabilization time (GST). In this model, n ≥ 3f + 1 is required
for non-faulty replicas to agree on the same commands in the same order (e.g., [12]) and progress can be ensured
deterministically only after GST [27].
When BFT SMR protocols were originally conceived, a typical target system size was n = 4 or n = 7, deployed
on a local-area network. However, the renewed interest in Byzantine fault-tolerance brought about by its application
to blockchains now demands solutions that can scale to much larger n. In contrast to permissionless blockchains such
as the one that supports Bitcoin, for example, so-called permissioned blockchains involve a xed set of replicas that
collectively maintain an ordered ledger of commands or, in other words, that support SMR. Despite their permis-
sioned nature, numbers of replicas in the hundreds or even thousands are envisioned (e.g., [42, 30]). Additionally,
their deployment to wide-area networks requires setting ∆ to accommodate higher variability in communication
delays.
The scaling challenge. Since the introduction of PBFT [20], the rst practical BFT replication solution in the
partial synchrony model, numerous BFT solutions were built around its core two-phase paradigm. The practical
aspect is that a stable leader can drive a consensus decision in just two rounds of message exchanges. The rst phase
guarantees proposal uniqueness through the formation of a quorum certicate (QC) consisting of (n−f) votes. The
second phase guarantees that the next leader can convince replicas to vote for a safe proposal.
The algorithm for a new leader to collect information and propose it to replicas—called a view-change—is the
epicenter of replication. Unfortunately, view-change based on the two-phase paradigm is far from simple [38], is
bug-prone [4], and incurs a signicant communication penalty for even moderate system sizes. It requires the new
leader to relay information from (n − f) replicas, each reporting its own highest known QC. Even counting just
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authenticators (digital signatures or message authentication codes), conveying a new proposal has a communication
footprint of O(n3) authenticators in PBFT, and variants that combine multiple authenticators into one via threshold
digital signatures (e.g., [18, 30]) still send O(n2) authenticators. The total number of authenticators transmitted if
O(n) view-changes occur before a single consensus decision is reached is O(n4) in PBFT, and even with threshold
signatures is O(n3). This scaling challenge plagues not only PBFT, but many other protocols developed since then,
e.g., Prime [9], Zyzzyva [34], Upright [22], BFT-SMaRt [13], 700BFT [11], and SBFT [30].
HotStu revolves around a three-phase core, allowing a new leader to simply pick the highest QC it knows of.
It introduces a second phase that allows replicas to “change their mind” after voting in the phase, without requiring
a leader proof at all. This alleviates the above complexity, and at the same time considerably simplies the leader
replacement protocol. Last, having (almost) canonized all the phases, it is very easy to pipeline HotStu, and to
frequently rotate leaders.
To our knowledge, only BFT protocols in the blockchain arena like Tendermint [15, 16] and Casper [17] fol-
low such a simple leader regime. However, these systems are built around a synchronous core, wherein proposals
are made in pre-determined intervals that must accommodate the worst-case time it takes to propagate messages
over a wide-area peer-to-peer gossip network. In doing so, they forego a hallmark of most practical BFT SMR solu-
tions (including those listed above), namely optimistic responsiveness [42]. Informally, responsiveness requires that a
non-faulty leader, once designated, can drive the protocol to consensus in time depending only on the actual mes-
sage delays, independent of any known upper bound on message transmission delays [10]. More appropriate for
our model is optimistic responsiveness, which requires responsiveness only in benecial (and hopefully common)
circumstances—here, after GST is reached. Optimistic or not, responsiveness is precluded with designs such as Ten-
dermint/Casper. The crux of the diculty is that there may exist an honest replica that has the highest QC, but the
leader does not know about it. One can build scenarios where this prevents progress ad innitum (see Section 4.4
for a detailed liveless scenario). Indeed, failing to incorporate necessary delays at crucial protocol steps can result in
losing liveness outright, as has been reported in several existing deployments, e.g., see [3, 2, 19].
Our contributions. To our knowledge, we present the rst BFT SMR protocol, called HotStu, to achieve the
following two properties:
• Linear View Change: After GST, any correct leader, once designated, sends only O(n) authenticators to
drive a consensus decision. This includes the case where a leader is replaced. Consequently, communication
costs to reach consensus after GST is O(n2) authenticators in the worst case of cascading leader failures.
• Optimistic Responsiveness: After GST, any correct leader, once designated, needs to wait just for the rst
n − f responses to guarantee that it can create a proposal that will make progress. This includes the case
where a leader is replaced.
Another feature of HotStu is that the costs for a new leader to drive the protocol to consensus is no greater
than that for the current leader. As such, HotStu supports frequent succession of leaders, which has been argued
is useful in blockchain contexts for ensuring chain quality [28].
HotStu achieves these properties by adding another phase to each view, a small price to latency in return
for considerably simplifying the leader replacement protocol. This exchange incurs only the actual network delays,
which are typically far smaller than ∆ in practice. As such, we expect this added latency to be much smaller than that
incurred by previous protocols that forgo responsiveness to achieve linear view-change. Furthermore, throughput
is not aected due to the ecient pipeline we introduce in Section 5.
In addition to the theoretical contribution, HotStu also provides insights in understanding BFT replication in
general and instantiating the protocol in practice (see Section 6):
• A framework for BFT replication over graphs of nodes. Safety is specied via voting and commit graph rules.
Liveness is specied separately via a Pacemaker that extends the graph with new nodes.
• A casting of several known protocols (DLS, PBFT, Tendermint, and Casper) and one new (ours, HotStu), in
this framework.
HotStu has the additional benet of being remarkably simple, owing in part to its economy of mechanism: There
are only two message types and simple rules to determine how a replica treats each. Safety is specied via voting
and commit rules over graphs of nodes. The mechanisms needed to achieve liveness are encapsulated within a
Pacemaker, cleanly separated from the mechanisms needed for safety. At the same time, it is expressive in that it
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allows the representation of several known protocols (DLS, PBFT, Tendermint, and Casper) as minor variations. In
part this exibility derives from its operation over a graph of nodes, in a way that forms a bridge between classical
BFT foundations and modern blockchains.
We describe a prototype implementation and a preliminary evaluation of HotStu. Deployed over a network with
over a hundred replicas, HotStu achieves throughput and latency comparable to, and sometimes exceeding, those
of mature systems such as BFT-SMaRt, whose code complexity far exceeds that of HotStu. We further demonstrate
that the communication footprint of HotStu remains constant in face of frequent leader replacements, whereas
BFT-SMaRt grows quadratically with the number of replicas.
Protocol Authenticator complexity Responsiveness
Correct leader Leader failure (view-change) f leader failures
DLS [25] O(n4) O(n4) O(n4)
PBFT [20] O(n2) O(n3) O(fn3) X
SBFT [30] O(n) O(n2) O(fn2) X
Tendermint [15] / Casper [17] O(n2) O(n2) O(fn2)
Tendermint* / Casper* O(n) O(n) O(fn)
HotStu O(n) O(n) O(fn) !
*Signatures can be combined using threshold signatures, though this optimization is not mentioned in their original works.
Table 1: Performance of selected protocols after GST.
2 Related work
Reaching consensus in face of Byzantine failures was formulated as the Byzantine Generals Problem by Lamport et
al. [37], who also coined the term “Byzantine failures”. The rst synchronous solution was given by Pease et al. [43],
and later improved by Dolev and Strong [24]. The improved protocol has O(n3) communication complexity, which
was shown optimal by Dolev and Reischuk [23]. A leader-based synchronous protocol that uses randomness was
given by Katz and Koo [32], showing an expected constant-round solution with (n− 1)/2 resilience.
Meanwhile, in the asynchronous settings, Fischer et al. [27] showed that the problem is unsolvable determin-
istically in asynchronous setting in face of a single failure. Furthermore, an (n − 1)/3 resilience bound for any
asynchronous solution was proven by Ben-Or [12]. Two approaches were devised to circumvent the impossibility.
One relies on randomness, initially shown by Ben-Or [12], using independently random coin ips by processes until
they happen to converge to consensus. Later works used cryptographic methods to share an unpredictable coin and
drive complexities down to constant expected rounds, and O(n3) communication [18].
The second approach relies on partial synchrony, rst shown by Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer (DLS) [25]. This
protocol preserves safety during asynchronous periods, and after the system becomes synchronous, DLS guarantees
termination. Once synchrony is maintained, DLS incurs O(n4) total communication and O(n) rounds per decision.
State machine replication relies on consensus at its core to order client requests so that correct replicas execute
them in this order. The recurring need for consensus in SMR led Lamport to devise Paxos [36], a protocol that
operates an ecient pipeline in which a stable leader drives decisions with linear communication and one round-
trip. A similar emphasis led Castro and Liskov [20, 21] to develop an ecient leader-based Byzantine SMR protocol
named PBFT, whose stable leader requires O(n2) communication and two round-trips per decision, and the leader
replacement protocol incurs O(n3) communication. PBFT has been deployed in several systems, including BFT-
SMaRt [13]. Kotla et al. introduced an optimistic linear path into PBFT in a protocol named Zyzzyva [34], which
was utilized in several systems, e.g., Upright [22] and Byzcoin [33]. The optimistic path has linear complexity, while
the leader replacement protocol remains O(n3). Abraham et al. [4] later exposed a safety violation in Zyzzyva, and
presented xes [5, 30]. On the other hand, to also reduce the complexity of the protocol itself, Song et al. proposed
Bosco [49], a simple one-step protocol with low latency on the optimistic path, requiring 5f + 1 replicas. SBFT [30]
introduces anO(n2) communication view-change protocol that supports a stable leader protocol with optimistically
linear, one round-trip decisions. It reduces the communication complexity by harnessing two methods: a collector-
based communication paradigm by Reiter [45], and signature combining via threshold cryptography on protocol
votes by Cachin et al. [18].
A leader-based Byzantine SMR protocol that employs randomization was presented by Ramasamy et al. [44], and
a leaderless variant named HoneyBadgerBFT was developed by Miller et al. [39]. At their core, these randomized
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Byzantine solutions employ randomized asynchronous Byzantine consensus, whose best known communication
complexity was O(n3) (see above), amortizing the cost via batching. However, most recently, based on the idea in
this HotStu paper, a parallel submission to PODC’19 [8] further improves the communication complexity toO(n2).
Bitcoin’s core is a protocol known as Nakamoto Consensus [40], a synchronous protocol with only probabilistic
safety guarantee and no nality (see analysis in [28, 41, 6]). It operates in a permissionless model where participants
are unknown, and resilience is kept via Proof-of-Work. As described above, recent blockchain solutions hybridize
Proof-of-Work solutions with classical BFT solutions in various ways [26, 33, 7, 17, 29, 31, 42]. The need to address
rotating leaders in these hybrid solutions and others provide the motivation behind HotStu.
3 Model
We consider a system consisting of a xed set of n = 3f + 1 replicas, indexed by i ∈ [n] where [n] = {1, . . . , n}. A
set F ⊂ [n] of up to f = |F | replicas are Byzantine faulty, and the remaining ones are correct. We will often refer
to the Byzantine replicas as being coordinated by an adversary, which learns all internal state held by these replicas
(including their cryptographic keys, see below).
Network communication is point-to-point, authenticated and reliable: one correct replica receives a message
from another correct replica if and only if the latter sent that message to the former. When we refer to a “broadcast”,
it involves the broadcaster, if correct, sending the same point-to-point messages to all replicas, including itself.
We adopt the partial synchrony model of Dwork et al. [25], where there is a known bound ∆ and an unknown
Global Stabilization Time (GST), such that after GST, all transmissions between two correct replicas arrive within
time ∆. Our protocol will ensure safety always, and will guarantee progress within a bounded duration after GST.
(Guaranteeing progress before GST is impossible [27].) In practice, our protocol will guarantee progress if the system
remains stable (i.e., if messages arrive within ∆ time) for suciently long after GST, though assuming that it does
so forever simplies discussion.
Cryptographic primitives. HotStu makes use of threshold signatures [48, 18, 14]. In a (k, n)-threshold signa-
ture scheme, there is a single public key held by all replicas, and each of the n replicas holds a distinct private
key. The i-th replica can use its private key to contribute a partial signature ρi ← tsigni(m) on message m.
Partial signatures {ρi}i∈I , where |I| = k and each ρi ← tsigni(m), can be used to produce a digital signature
σ ← tcombine(m, {ρi}i∈I) on m. Any other replica can verify the signature using the public key and the func-
tion tverify . We require that if ρi ← tsigni(m) for each i ∈ I , |I| = k, and if σ ← tcombine(m, {ρi}i∈I), then
tverify(m,σ) returns true. However, given oracle access to oracles {tsigni(·)}i∈[n]\F , an adversary who queries
tsigni(m) on strictly fewer than k − f of these oracles has negligible probability of producing a signature σ for the
message m (i.e., such that tverify(m,σ) returns true). Throughout this paper, we use a threshold of k = 2f + 1.
Again, we will typically leave invocations of tverify implicit in our protocol descriptions.
We also require a cryptographic hash function h (also called a message digest function), which maps an arbitrary-
length input to a xed-length output. The hash function must be collision resistant [46], which informally requires
that the probability of an adversary producing inputs m and m′ such that h(m) = h(m′) is negligible. As such,
h(m) can serve as an identier for a unique input m in the protocol.
Complexity measure. The complexity measure we care about is authenticator complexity, which specically is
the sum, over all replicas i ∈ [n], of the number of authenticators received by replica i in the protocol to reach
a consensus decision after GST. (Again, before GST, a consensus decision might not be reached at all in the worst
case [27].) Here, an authenticator is either a partial signature or a signature. Authenticator complexity is a useful
measure of communication complexity for several reasons. First, like bit complexity and unlike message complexity,
it hides unnecessary details about the transmission topology. For example, n messages carrying one authenticator
count the same as one message carrying n authenticators. Second, authenticator complexity is better suited than bit
complexity for capturing costs in protocols like ours that reach consensus repeatedly, where each consensus decision
(or each view proposed on the way to that consensus decision) is identied by a monotonically increasing counter.
That is, because such a counter increases indenitely, the bit complexity of a protocol that sends such a counter
cannot be bounded. Third, since in practice, cryptographic operations to produce or verify digital signatures and to
produce or combine partial signatures are typically the most computationally intensive operations in protocols that
use them, the authenticator complexity provides insight into the computational burden of the protocol, as well.
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4 Basic HotStu
HotStu solves the State Machine Replication (SMR) problem. At the core of SMR is a protocol for deciding on a
growing log of command requests by clients. A group of state-machine replicas apply commands in sequence order
consistently. A client sends a command request to all replicas, and waits for responses from (f + 1) of them. For the
most part, we omit the client from the discussion, and defer to the standard literature for issues regarding numbering
and de-duplication of client requests.
The Basic HotStu solution is presented in Algorithm 2. The protocol works in a succession of views numbered
with monotonically increasing view numbers. Each viewNumber has a unique dedicated leader known to all. Each
replica stores a tree of pending commands as its local data structure. Each tree node contains a proposed command
(or a batch of them), metadata associated with the protocol, and a parent link. The branch led by a given node is
the path from the node all the way to the tree root by visiting parent links. During the protocol, a monotonically
growing branch becomes committed. To become committed, the leader of a particular view proposing the branch
must collect votes from a quorum of (n− f) replicas in three phases, prepare, pre-commit, and commit.
A key ingredient in the protocol is a collection of (n − f) votes over a leader proposal, referred to as a quorum
certicate (or “QC” in short). The QC is associated with a particular node and a view number. The tcombine utility
employs a threshold signature scheme to generate a representation of (n− f) signed votes as a single authenticator.
Below we give an operational description of the protocol logic by phases, followed by a precise specication in
Algorithm 2, and conclude the section with safety, liveness, and complexity arguments.
4.1 Phases
prepare phase. The protocol for a new leader starts by collecting new-view messages from (n − f) replicas.
The new-view message is sent by a replica as it transitions into viewNumber (including the rst view) and carries
the highest prepareQC that the replica received (⊥ if none), as described below.
The leader processes these messages in order to select a branch that has the highest preceding view in which
a prepareQC was formed. The leader selects the prepareQC with the highest view, denoted highQC , among the
new-view messages. Because highQC is the highest among (n− f) replicas, no higher view could have reached a
commit decision. The branch led by highQC .node is therefore safe.
Collecting new-view messages to select a safe branch may be omitted by an incumbent leader, who may simply
select its own highest prepareQC as highQC . We defer this optimization to Section 6 and only describe a single,
unied leader protocol in this section. Note that, dierent from PBFT-like protocols, including this step in the leader
protocol is straightforward, and it incurs the same, linear overhead as all the other phases of the protocol, regardless
of the situation.
The leader uses the createLeaf method to extend the tail of highQC .node with a new proposal. The method
creates a new leaf node as a child and embeds a digest of the parent in the child node. The leader then sends the new
node in a prepare message to all other replicas. The proposal carries highQC for safety justication.
Upon receiving the prepare message for the current view from the leader, replica r uses the safeNode predicate
to determine whether to accept it. If it is accepted, the replica sends a prepare vote with a partial signature (produced
by tsignr) for the proposal to the leader.
safeNodepredicate. The safeNode predicate is a core ingredient of the protocol. It examines a proposal message
m carrying a QC justication m.justify , and determines whether m.node is safe to accept. The safety rule to accept
a proposal is the branch of m.node extends from the currently locked node lockedQC .node . On the other hand, the
liveness rule is the replica will accept m if m.justify has a higher view than the current lockedQC . The predicate is
true as long as either one of two rules holds.
pre-commit phase. When the leader receives (n − f) prepare votes for the current proposal curProposal , it
combines them into a prepareQC . The leader broadcasts prepareQC in pre-commit messages. A replica responds
to the leader with pre-commit vote having a signed digest of the proposal.
commit phase. The commit phase is similar to pre-commit phase. When the leader receives (n−f) pre-commit
votes, it combines them into a precommitQC and broadcasts it in commit messages; replicas respond to it with a
commit vote. Importantly, a replica becomes locked on the precommitQC at this point by setting its lockedQC
to precommitQC (Line 25 of Algorithm 2). This is crucial to guard the safety of the proposal in case it becomes a
consensus decision.
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decide phase. When the leader receives (n − f) commit votes, it combines them into a commitQC . Once
the leader has assembled a commitQC , it sends it in a decide message to all other replicas. Upon receiving a
decide message, a replica considers the proposal embodied in the commitQC a committed decision, and executes
the commands in the committed branch. The replica increments viewNumber and starts the next view.
nextView interrupt. In all phases, a replica waits for a message at view viewNumber for a timeout period,
determined by an auxiliary nextView(viewNumber) utility. If nextView(viewNumber) interrupts waiting, the
replica also increments viewNumber and starts the next view.
4.2 Data Structures
Messages. A message m in the protocol has a xed set of elds that are populated using the Msg() utility shown
in Algorithm 1. m is automatically stamped with curView , the sender’s current view number. Each message has
a type m.type ∈ {new-view, prepare, pre-commit, commit,decide}. m.node contains a proposed node (the leaf
node of a proposed branch). There is an optional eld m.justify . The leader always uses this eld to carry the QC
for the dierent phases. Replicas use it in new-view messages to carry the highest prepareQC . Each message sent
in a replica role contains a partial signature m.partialSig by the sender over the tuple 〈m.type , m.viewNumber ,
m.node〉, which is added in the voteMsg() utility.
Quorum certicates. A Quorum Certicate (QC) over a tuple 〈type, viewNumber ,node〉 is a data type that com-
bines a collection of signatures for the same tuple signed by (n − f) replicas. Given a QC qc, we use qc.type ,
qc.viewNumber , qc.node to refer to the matching elds of the original tuple.
Tree and branches. Each command is wrapped in a node that additionally contains a parent link which could be
a hash digest of the parent node. We omit the implementation details from the pseudocode. During the protocol, a
replica delivers a message only after the branch led by the node is already in its local tree. In practice, a recipient
who falls behind can catch up by fetching missing nodes from other replicas. For brevity, these details are also
omitted from the pseudocode. Two branches are conicting if neither one is an extension of the other. Two nodes
are conicting if the branches led by them are conicting.
Bookkeeping variables. A replica uses additional local variables for bookkeeping the protocol state: (i) a viewNumber ,
initially 1 and incremented either by nishing a decision or by a nextView interrupt; (ii) a locked quorum certicate
lockedQC , initially ⊥, storing the highest QC for which a replica voted commit; and (iii) a prepareQC , initially ⊥,
storing the highest QC for which a replica voted pre-commit. Additionally, in order to incrementally execute a com-
mitted log of commands, the replica maintains the highest node whose branch has been executed. This is omitted
below for brevity.
4.3 Protocol Specication
The protocol given in Algorithm 2 is described as an iterated view-by-view loop. In each view, a replica performs
phases in succession based on its role, described as a succession of “as” blocks. A replica can have more than one role.
For example, a leader is also a (normal) replica. Execution of as blocks across roles can be proceeded concurrently.
The execution of each as block is atomic. A nextView interrupt aborts all operations in any as block, and jumps to
the “Finally” block.
Algorithm 1 Utilities (for replica r).
1: functionMsg(type , node , qc)
2: m.type ← type
3: m.viewNumber ← curView
4: m.node ← node
5: m.justify ← qc
6: returnm
7: function voteMsg(type , node , qc)
8: m← Msg(type,node, qc)
9: m.partialSig ← tsignr(〈m.type,m.viewNumber ,m.node〉)
10: returnm
11: procedure createLeaf(parent , cmd )
12: b.parent ← parent
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13: b.cmd ← cmd
14: return b
15: function QC(V )
16: qc.type ← m.type : m ∈ V
17: qc.viewNumber ← m.viewNumber : m ∈ V
18: qc.node ← m.node : m ∈ V
19: qc.sig ← tcombine(〈qc.type, qc.viewNumber , qc.node〉, {m.partialSig | m ∈ V })
20: return qc
21: function matchingMsg(m, t, v)
22: return (m.type = t) ∧ (m.viewNumber = v)
23: function matchingQC(qc, t, v)
24: return (qc.type = t) ∧ (qc.viewNumber = v)
25: function safeNode(node , qc)
26: return (node extends from lockedQC .node) ∨ // safety rule
27: (qc.viewNumber > lockedQC .viewNumber) // liveness rule
Algorithm 2 Basic HotStu protocol (for replica r).
1: for curView ← 1, 2, 3, . . . do
. prepare phase
2: as a leader // r = leader(curView)
// we assume special new-view messages from view 0
3: wait for (n− f) new-view messages: M ← {m | matchingMsg(m,new-view, curView − 1)}
4: highQC ←
(
argmax
m∈M
{m.justify .viewNumber}
)
.justify
5: curProposal ← createLeaf(highQC .node, client’s command)
6: broadcast Msg(prepare, curProposal , highQC )
7: as a replica
8: wait for message m : matchingMsg(m, prepare, curView) from leader(curView)
9: if m.node extends from m.justify .node ∧
safeNode(m.node,m.justify) then
10: send voteMsg(prepare,m.node,⊥) to leader(curView)
. pre-commit phase
11: as a leader
12: wait for (n− f) votes: V ← {v | matchingMsg(v, prepare, curView)}
13: prepareQC ← QC(V )
14: broadcast Msg(pre-commit,⊥, prepareQC )
15: as a replica
16: wait for message m : matchingQC(m.justify , prepare, curView) from leader(curView)
17: prepareQC ← m.justify
18: send voteMsg(pre-commit,m.justify .node,⊥) to leader(curView)
. commit phase
19: as a leader
20: wait for (n− f) votes: V ← {v | matchingMsg(v, pre-commit, curView)}
21: precommitQC ← QC(V )
22: broadcast Msg(commit,⊥, precommitQC )
23: as a replica
24: wait for message m : matchingQC(m.justify , pre-commit, curView) from leader(curView)
25: lockedQC ← m.justify
26: send voteMsg(commit,m.justify .node,⊥) to leader(curView)
. decide phase
27: as a leader
28: wait for (n− f) votes: V ← {v | matchingMsg(v, commit, curView)}
29: commitQC ← QC(V )
30: broadcast Msg(decide,⊥, commitQC )
31: as a replica
32: wait for message m from leader(curView)
33: wait for message m : matchingQC(m.justify , commit, curView) from leader(curView)
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34: execute new commands through m.justify .node , respond to clients
. Finally
35: nextView interrupt: goto this line if nextView(curView) is called during “wait for” in any phase
36: send Msg(new-view,⊥, prepareQC ) to leader(curView + 1)
4.4 Safety, Liveness, and Complexity
Safety. We rst dene a quorum certicate qc to be valid if tverify(〈qc.type , qc.viewNumber , qc.node〉, qc.sig)
is true.
Lemma 1. For any valid qc1, qc2 in which qc1.type = qc2.type and qc1.node conicts with qc2.node , we have
qc1.viewNumber 6= qc2.viewNumber .
Proof. To show a contradiction, suppose qc1.viewNumber = qc2.viewNumber = v. Because a valid QC can be
formed only with n − f = 2f + 1 votes (i.e., partial signatures) for it, there must be a correct replica who voted
twice in the same phase of v. This is impossible because the pseudocode allows voting only once for each phase in
each view.
Theorem 2. If w and b are conicting nodes, then they cannot be both committed, each by a correct replica.
Proof. We prove this important theorem by contradiction. Let qc1 denote a valid commitQC (i.e., qc1.type =
commit) such that qc1.node = w, and qc2 denote a valid commitQC such that qc2.node = b. Denote v1 =
qc1.viewNumber and v2 = qc2.viewNumber . By Lemma 1, v1 6= v2. W.l.o.g. assume v1 < v2.
We will now denote by vs the lowest view higher than v1 for which there is a valid prepareQC , qcs (i.e.,
qcs.type = prepare) where qcs.viewNumber = vs, and qcs.node conicts with w. Formally, we dene the fol-
lowing predicate for any prepareQC :
E(prepareQC ) :=(v1 < prepareQC .viewNumber ≤ v2) ∧ (prepareQC .node conicts with w).
We can now set the rst switching point qcs:
qcs := arg min
prepareQC
{prepareQC .viewNumber | prepareQC is valid ∧ E(prepareQC )} .
Note that, by assumption such a qcs must exist; for example, qcs could be the prepareQC formed in view v2.
Of the correct replicas that sent a partial result tsignr(〈qc1.type , qc1.viewNumber , qc1.node〉), let r be the rst
that contributed tsignr(〈qcs.type , qcs.viewNumber , qcs.node〉); such an rmust exist since otherwise, one of qc1.sig
and qcs.sig could not have been created. During view v1, replica r updates its lock lockedQC to a precommitQC
on w at Line 25 of Algorithm 2. Due to the minimality of vs, the lock that replica r has on the branch led by w is not
changed before qcs is formed. Otherwise r must have seen some other prepareQC with lower view because Line 17
comes before Line 25, contradicting to the minimality. Now consider the invocation of safeNode in the prepare
phase of view vs by replica r, with a message m carrying m.node = qcs.node . By assumption, m.node conicts
with lockedQC .node , and so the disjunct at Line 26 of Algorithm 1 is false. Moreover, m.justify .viewNumber > v1
would violate the minimality of vs, and so the disjunct in Line 27 of Algorithm 1 is also false. Thus, safeNode must
return false and r cannot cast a prepare vote on the conicting branch in view vs, a contradiction.
Liveness. There are two functions left undened in the previous section: leader and nextView. Their denition
will not aect safety of the protocol, though they do matter to liveness. Before giving candidate denitions for them,
we rst show that after GST, there is a bounded duration Tf such that if all correct replicas remain in view v during
Tf and the leader for view v is correct, then a decision is reached. Below, we say that qc1 and qc2 match if qc1 and
qc2 are valid, qc1.node = qc2.node , and qc1.viewNumber = qc2.viewNumber .
Lemma 3. If a correct replica is locked such that lockedQC = precommitQC , then at least f+1 correct replicas voted
for some prepareQC matching lockedQC .
Proof. Suppose replica r is locked on precommitQC . Then, (n − f) votes were cast for the matching prepareQC
in the prepare phase (Line 10 of Algorithm 2), out of which at least f + 1 were from correct replicas.
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Theorem 4. After GST, there exists a bounded time period Tf such that if all correct replicas remain in view v during
Tf and the leader for view v is correct, then a decision is reached.
Proof. Starting in a new view, the leader collects (n − f) new-view messages and calculates its highQC before
broadcasting a prepare messsage. Suppose among all replicas (including the leader itself), the highest kept lock
is lockedQC = precommitQC ∗. By Lemma 3, we know there are at least f + 1 correct replicas that voted for a
prepareQC ∗matching precommitQC ∗, and have already sent them to the leader in theirnew-viewmessages. Thus,
the leader must learn a matching prepareQC ∗ in at least one of these new-view messages and use it as highQC in
its prepare message. By the assumption, all correct replicas are synchronized in their view and the leader is non-
faulty. Therefore, all correct replicas will vote in the prepare phase, since in safeNode, the condition on Line 27
of Algorithm 1 is satised (even if the node in the message conicts with a replica’s stale lockedQC .node , and so
Line 26 is not). Then, after the leader assembles a valid prepareQC for this view, all replicas will vote in all the
following phases, leading to a new decision. After GST, the duration Tf for these phases to complete is of bounded
length.
The protocol is Optimistically Responsive because there is no explicit “wait-for-∆” step, and the logical disjunc-
tion in safeNode is used to override a stale lock with the help of the three-phase paradigm.
We now provide simple constructions for leader andnextView that suce to ensure that after GST, eventually a
view will be reached in which the leader is correct and all correct replicas remain in this view for Tf time. It suces
for leader to return some deterministic mapping from view number to a replica, eventually rotating through all
replicas. A possible solution for nextView is to utilize an exponential back-o mechanism that maintains a timeout
interval. Then a timer is set upon entering each view. When the timer goes o without making any decision, the
replica doubles the interval and calls nextView to advance the view. Since the interval is doubled at each time, the
waiting intervals of all correct replicas will eventually have at least Tf overlap in common, during which the leader
could drive a decision.
Livelessness with two-phases. We now briey demonstrate an innite non-deciding scenario for a “two-phase”
HotStu. This explains the necessity for introducing a synchronous delay in Casper and Tendermint, and hence for
abandoning (Optimistic) Responsiveness.
In the two-phase HotStu variant, we omit the pre-commit phase and proceed directly to commit. A replica
becomes locked when it votes on a prepareQC . Suppose, in view v, a leader proposes b. It completes the prepare
phase, and some replica rv votes for the prepareQC , say qc, such that qc.node = b. Hence, rv becomes locked on
qc. An asynchronous network scheduling causes the rest of the replicas to move to view v+ 1 without receiving qc.
We now repeat ad innitum the following single-view transcript. We start view v + 1 with only rv holding
the highest prepareQC (i.e. qc) in the system. The new leader l collects new-view messages from 2f + 1 replicas
excluding rv . The highest prepareQC among these, qc′, has view v − 1 and b′ = qc′.node conicts with b. l then
proposes b′′ which extends b′, to which 2f honest replicas respond with a vote, but rv rejects it because it is locked
on qc, b′′ conicts with b and qc′ is lower than qc. Eventaully, 2f replicas give up and move to the next view. Just
then, a faulty replica responds to l’s proposal, l then puts together a prepareQC (v+1, b′′) and one replica, say rv+1
votes for it and becomes locked on it.
Complexity. In each phase of HotStu, only the leader broadcasts to all replicas while the replicas respond to
the sender once with a partial signature to certify the vote. In the leader’s message, the QC consists of a proof of
(n−f) votes collected previously, which can be encoded by a single threshold signature. In a replica’s response, the
partial signature from that replica is the only authenticator. Therefore, in each phase, there are O(n) authenticators
received in total. As there is a constant number of phases, the overall complexity per view is O(n).
5 Chained HotStu
It takes three phases for a Basic HotStu leader to commit a proposal. These phases are not doing “useful” work
except collecting votes from replicas, and they are all very similar. In Chained HotStu, we improve the Basic
HotStu protocol utility while at the same time considerably simplifying it. The idea is to change the view on every
prepare phase, so each proposal has its own view. This reduces the number of message types and allows for pipelining
of decisions. A similar approach for message type reduction was suggested in Casper [1].
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Figure 1: Chained HotStu is a pipelined Basic HotStu where a QC can serve in dierent phases simultaneously.
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Figure 2: The nodes at views v4, v5, v6 form a Three-Chain. The node at view v8 does not make a valid One-Chain
in Chained HotStu (but it is a valid One-Chain after relaxation in the algorithm of Section 6).
More specically, in Chained HotStu the votes over a prepare phase are collected in a view by the leader into a
genericQC . Then the genericQC is relayed to the leader of the next view, essentially delegating responsibility for
the next phase, which would have been pre-commit, to the next leader. However, the next leader does not actually
carry a pre-commit phase, but instead initiates a new prepare phase and adds its own proposal. This prepare
phase for view v + 1 simultaneously serves as the pre-commit phase for view v. The prepare phase for view v + 2
simultaneously serves as the pre-commit phase for view v+ 1 and as the commit phase for view v. This is possible
because all the phases have identical structure.
The pipeline of Basic HotStu protocol phases embedded in a chain of Chained HotStu proposals is depicted in
Figure 1. Views v1, v2, v3 of Chained HotStu serve as the prepare, pre-commit, and commit Basic HotStu phases
for cmd1 proposed in v1. This command becomes committed by the end of v4. Views v2, v3, v4 serve as the three
Basic HotStu phases for cmd2 proposed in v2, and it becomes committed by the end of v5. Additional proposals
generated in these phases continue the pipeline similarly, and are denoted by dashed boxes. In Figure 1, a single
arrow denotes the b.parent eld for a node b, and a double arrow denotes b.justify .node .
Hence, there are only two types of messages in Chained HotStu, a new-view message and generic-phase
generic message. The generic QC functions in all logically pipelined phases. We next explain the mechanisms
in the pipeline to take care of locking and committing, which occur only in the commit and decide phases of Basic
HotStu.
Dummy nodes. The genericQC used by a leader in some view viewNumber may not directly reference the pro-
posal of the preceding view (viewNumber−1). The reason is that the leader of a preceding view fails to obtain a QC,
either because there are conicting proposals, or due to a benign crash. To simplify the tree structure, createLeaf
extends genericQC .node with blank nodes up to the height (the number of parent links on a node’s branch) of the
proposing view, so view-numbers are equated with node heights. As a result, the QC embedded in a node b may not
refer to its parent, i.e., b.justify .node may not equal b.parent (the last node in Figure 2).
One-Chain, Two-Chain, and Three-Chain. When a node b∗ carries a QC that refers to a direct parent, i.e.,
b∗.justify .node = b∗.parent , we say that it forms a One-Chain. Denote by b′′ = b∗.justify .node . Node b∗ forms a
Two-Chain, if in addition to forming a One-Chain, b′′.justify .node = b′′.parent . It forms a Three-Chain, if b′′ forms
a Two-Chain.
Looking at chain b = b′.justify .node , b′ = b′′.justify .node , b′′ = b∗.justify .node , ancestry gaps might occur at
any one of the nodes. These situations are similar to a leader of Basic HotStu failing to complete any one of three
phases, and getting interrupted to the next view by nextView.
If b∗ forms a One-Chain, the prepare phase of b′′ has succeeded. Hence, when a replica votes for b∗, it should
remember genericQC ← b∗.justify . We remark that it is safe to update genericQC even when a One-Chain is not
direct, so long as it is higher than the current genericQC . In the implementation code described in Section 6, we
indeed update genericQC in this case.
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If b∗ forms a Two-Chain, then the pre-commit phase of b′ has succeeded. The replica should therefore update
lockedQC ← b′′.justify . Again, we remark that the lock can be updated even when a Two-Chain is not direct—safety
will not break—and indeed, this is given in the implementation code in Section 6.
Finally, if b∗ forms a Three-Chain, the commit phase of b has succeeded, and b becomes a committed decision.
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudocode for Chained HotStu. The proof of safety given by Theorem 5 in Appendix A
is similar to the one for Basic HotStu. We require the QC in a valid node refers to its ancestor. For brevity, we
assume the constraint always holds and omit checking in the code.
Algorithm 3 Chained HotStu protocol.
1: procedure createLeaf(parent , cmd , qc)
2: b.parent ← branch extending with blanks from parent to height curView
3: b.cmd ← cmd
4: b.justify ← qc
5: return b
6: for curView ← 1, 2, 3, . . . do
. generic phase
7: as a leader // r = leader(curView)
// M is the set of messages collected at the end of previous view by the leader of this view
8: highQC ←
(
argmax
m∈M
{m.justify .viewNumber}
)
.justify
9: if highQC .viewNumber > genericQC .viewNumber then genericQC ← highQC
10: curProposal ← createLeaf(genericQC .node, client’s command, genericQC )
// prepare phase
11: broadcast Msg(generic, curProposal ,⊥)
12: as a replica
13: wait for message m : matchingMsg(m, generic, curView) from leader(curView)
14: b∗ ← m.node ; b′′ ← b∗.justify .node ; b′ ← b′′.justify .node ; b← b′.justify .node
15: if safeNode(b∗, b∗.justify) then
16: send voteMsg(generic, b∗,⊥) to leader(curView + 1)
// start pre-commit phase on b∗’s parent
17: if b∗.parent = b′′ then
18: genericQC ← b∗.justify
// start commit phase on b∗’s grandparent
19: if (b∗.parent = b′′) ∧ (b′′.parent = b′) then
20: lockedQC ← b′′.justify
// start decide phase on b∗’s great-grandparent
21: if (b∗.parent = b′′) ∧ (b′′.parent = b′) ∧ (b′.parent = b) then
22: execute new commands through b, respond to clients
23: as the next leader
24: wait for all messages: M ← {m | matchingMsg(m, generic, curView)}
until there are (n− f) votes: V ← {v | v.partialSig 6= ⊥ ∧ v ∈M}
25: genericQC ← QC(V )
. Finally
26: nextView interrupt: goto this line if nextView(curView) is called during “wait for” in any phase
27: send Msg(generic,⊥, genericQC ) to leader(curView + 1)
6 Implementation
HotStu is a practical protocol for building ecient SMR systems. Because of its simplicity, we can easily turn Algo-
rithm 3 into an event-driven-style specication that is almost like the code skeleton for a prototype implementation.
As shown in Algorithm 4, the code is further simplied and generalized by extracting the liveness mechanism
from the body into a module named Pacemaker. Instead of the next leader always waiting for a genericQC at the
end of the generic phase before starting its reign, this logic is delegated to the Pacemaker. A stable leader can skip
this step and streamline proposals across multiple heights. Additionally, we relax the direct parent constraint for
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maintaining the highest genericQC and lockedQC , while still preserving the requirement that the QC in a valid
node always refers to its ancestor. The proof of correctness is similar to Chained HotStu and we also defer it to the
appendix of [50].
Data structures. Each replica u keeps track of the following main state variables:
V [·] mapping from a node to its votes.
vheight height of last voted node.
block locked node (similar to lockedQC ).
bexec last executed node.
qchigh highest known QC (similar to genericQC ) kept by
a Pacemaker.
bleaf leaf node kept by a Pacemaker.
It also keeps a constant b0, the same genesis node known by all correct replicas. To bootstrap, b0 contains a hard-
coded QC for itself, block , bexec , bleaf are all initialized to b0, and qchigh contains the QC for b0.
Pacemaker. A Pacemaker is a mechanism that guarantees progress after GST. It achieves this through two ingre-
dients.
The rst one is “synchronization”, bringing all correct replicas, and a unique leader, into a common height for a
suciently long period. The usual synchronization mechanism in the literature [25, 20, 15] is for replicas to increase
the count of ∆’s they spend at larger heights, until progress is being made. A common way to deterministically elect
a leader is to use a rotating leader scheme in which all correct replicas keep a predened leader schedule and rotate
to the next one when the leader is demoted.
Second, a Pacemaker needs to provide the leader with a way to choose a proposal that will be supported by
correct replicas. As shown in Algorithm 5, after a view change, in onReceiveNewView, the new leader collects
new-view messages sent by replicas through onNextSyncView to discover the highest QC to satisfy the second
part of the condition in onReceiveProposal for liveness (Line 18 of Algorithm 4). During the same view, however,
the incumbent leader will chain the new node to the end of the leaf last proposed by itself, where no new-view
message is needed. Based on some application-specic heuristics (to wait until the previously proposed node gets a
QC, for example), the current leader invokes onBeat to propose a new node carrying the command to be executed.
It is worth noting that even if a bad Pacemaker invokes onPropose arbitrarily, or selects a parent and a QC capri-
ciously, and against any scheduling delays, safety is always guaranteed. Therefore, safety guaranteed by Algorithm 4
alone is entirely decoupled from liveness by any potential instantiation of Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 4 Event-driven HotStu (for replica u).
1: procedure createLeaf(parent , cmd , qc, height )
2: b.parent ← parent ; b.cmd ← cmd ;
3: b.justify ← qc; b.height ← height ; return b
4: procedure update(b∗)
5: b′′ ← b∗.justify .node ; b′ ← b′′.justify .node
6: b← b′.justify .node
// pre-commit phase on b′′
7: updateQCHigh(b∗.justify)
8: if b′.height > block .height then
9: block ← b′ // commit phase on b′
10: if (b′′.parent = b′) ∧ (b′.parent = b) then
11: onCommit(b)
12: bexec ← b // decide phase on b
13: procedure onCommit(b)
14: if bexec .height < b.height then
15: onCommit(b.parent); execute(b.cmd)
16: procedure onReceiveProposal(Msgv(generic, bnew ,⊥))
17: if bnew .height > vheight ∧ (bnew extends block∨
18: bnew .justify .node.height > block .height) then
19: vheight ← bnew .height
20: send(getLeader(), voteMsgu(generic, bnew ,⊥))
21: update(bnew )
22: procedureonReceiveVote(m = voteMsgv(generic, b,⊥))
23: if ∃〈v, σ′〉 ∈ V [b] then return // avoid duplicates
24: V [b]← V [b] ∪ {〈v,m.partialSig〉} // collect votes
25: if |V [b]| ≥ n− f then
26: qc ← QC({σ | 〈v′, σ〉 ∈ V [b]})
27: updateQCHigh(qc)
28: function onPropose(bleaf , cmd , qchigh )
29: bnew ← createLeaf(bleaf , cmd , qchigh , bleaf .height + 1)
// send to all replicas, including u itself
30: broadcast(Msgu(generic, bnew ,⊥))
31: return bnew
Algorithm 5 Code skeleton for a Pacemaker (for replica u).
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// We assume Pacemaker in all correct replicas will have
synchronized leadership after GST.
1: function getLeader // . . . specied by the application
2: procedure updateQCHigh(qc′high )
3: if qc′high .node.height > qchigh .node.height then
4: qchigh ← qc′high
5: bleaf ← qchigh .node
6: procedure onBeat(cmd )
7: if u = getLeader() then
8: bleaf ← onPropose(bleaf , cmd , qchigh)
9: procedure onNextSyncView
10: send Msg(new-view,⊥, qchigh) to getLeader()
11: procedureonReceiveNewView(Msg(new-view,⊥, qc′high ))
12: updateQCHigh(qc′high )
Algorithm 6 update replacement for two-phase HotStu.
1: procedure update(b∗)
2: b′ ← b∗.justify .node ; b← b′.justify .node
3: updateQCHigh(b∗.justify)
4: if b′.height > block .height then block ← b′
5: if (b′.parent = b) then onCommit(b); bexec ← b
Two-phase HotStu variant. To further demonstrate the exibility of the HotStu framework, Algorithm 6
shows the two-phase variant of HotStu. Only the update procedure is aected, a Two-Chain is required for reach-
ing a commit decision, and a One-Chain determines the lock. As discussed above (Section 4.4), this two-phase variant
loses Optimistic Responsiveness, and is similar to Tendermint/Casper. The benet is fewer phases, while liveness
may be addressed by incorporating in Pacemaker a wait based on maximum network delay. See Section 7.3 for
further discussion.
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Figure 3: Commit rules for dierent BFT protocols.
7 One-Chain and Two-Chain BFT Protocols
In this section, we examine four BFT replication protocols spanning four decades of research in Byzantine fault
tolernace, casting them into a chained framework similar to Chained HotStu.
Figure 3 provides a birds-eye view of the commit rules of ve protocols we consider, including HotStu.
In a nutshell, the commit rule in DLS [25] is One-Chain, allowing a node to be committed only by its own leader.
The commit rules in PBFT [20], Tendermint [15, 16] and Casper [17] are almost identical, and consist of Two-Chains.
They dier in the mechanisms they introduce for liveness, PBFT has leader “proofs” of quadratic size (no Linearity),
Tendermint and Casper introduce a mandatory ∆ delay before each leader proposal (no Optimistic Responsiveness).
HotStu uses a Three-Chain rule, and has a linear leader protocol without delay.
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7.1 DLS
The simplest commit rule is a One-Chain. Modeled after Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer (DLS), the rst known
asynchronous Byzantine Consensus solution, this rule is depicted in Figure 3(a). A replica becomes locked in DLS
on the highest node it voted for.
Unfortunately, this rule would easily lead to a deadlock if at some height, a leader equivocates, and two correct
replicas became locked on the conicting proposals at that height. Relinquishing either lock is unsafe unless there
are 2f + 1 that indicate they did not vote for the locked value.
Indeed, in DLS only the leader of each height can itself reach a commit decision by the One-Chain commit rule.
Thus, only the leader itself is harmed if it has equivocated. Replicas can relinquish a lock either if 2f + 1 replicas did
not vote for it, or if there are conicting proposals (signed by the leader). The unlocking protocol occurring at the
end of each height in DLS turns out to be fairly complex and expensive. Together with the fact that only the leader
for a height can decide, in the best scenario where no fault occurs and the network is timely, DLS requires n leader
rotations, andO(n4) message transmissions, per single decision. While it broke new ground in demonstrating a safe
asynchronous protocol, DLS was not designed as a practical solution.
7.2 PBFT
Modeled after PBFT, a more practical appraoch uses a Two-Chain commit rule, see Figure 3(b). When a replica votes
for a node that forms a One-Chain, it becomes locked on it. Conicting One-Chains at the same height are simply
not possible, as each has a QC, hence the deadlock situation of DLS is avoided.
However, if one replica holds a higher lock than others, a leader may not know about it even if it collects informa-
tion from n− f replicas. This could prevent leaders from reaching decisions ad innitum, purely due to scheduling.
To get “unstuck”, the PBFT unlocks all replicas by carrying a proof consisting of the highest One-Chain’s by 2f + 1
replicas. This proof is quite involved, as explained below.
The original PBFT, which has been open-sourced [20] and adopted in several follow up works [13, 34], a leader
proof contains a set of messages collected from n− f replicas reporting the highest One-Chain each member voted
for. Each One-Chain contains a QC, hence the total communication cost is O(n3). Harnessing signature combining
methods from [45, 18], SBFT [30] reduces this cost to O(n2) by turning each QC to a single value.
In the PBFT variant in [21], a leader proof contains the highest One-Chain the leader collected from the quorum
only once. It also includes one signed value from each member of the quorum, proving that it did not vote for a higher
One-Chain. Broadcasting this proof incurs communication complexity O(n2). Note that whereas the signatures on
a QC may be combined into a single value, the proof as a whole cannot be reduced to constant size because messages
from dierent members of the quorum may have dierent values.
In both variants, a correct replica unlocks even it has a higher One-Chain than the leader’s proof. Thus, a correct
leader can force its proposal to be accepted during period of synchrony, and liveness is guaranteed. The cost is
quadratic communication per leader replacement.
7.3 Tendermint and Casper
Tendermint has a Two-Chain commit rule identical to PBFT, and Casper has a Two-Chain rule in which the leaf does
not need to have a QC to direct parent. That is, in Casper, Figure 3(c,d) depicts the commit rules for Tendermint and
Casper, respectively.
In both methods, a leader simply sends the highest One-Chain it knows along with its proposal. A replica unlocks
a One-Chain if it receives from the leader a higher one.
However, because correct replicas may not vote for a leader’s node, to guarantee progress a new leader must
obtain the highest One-Chain by waiting the maximal network delay. Otherwise, if leaders only wait for the rst
n− f messages to start a new height, there is no progress guarantee. Leader delays are inherent both in Tendermint
and in Casper, in order to provide liveness.
This simple leader protocol embodies a linear leap in the communication complexity of the leader protocol,
which HotStu borrows from. As already mentioned above, a QC could be captured in a single value using threshold-
signatures, hence a leader can collect and disseminate the highest One-Chain with linear communication complexity.
However, crucially, due to the extra QC step, HotStu does not require the leader to wait the maximal network delay.
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8 Evaluation
We have implemented HotStu as a library in roughly 4K lines of C++ code. Most noticeably, the core consensus
logic specied in the pseudocode consumes only around 200 lines. In this section, we will rst examine baseline
throughput and latency by comparing to a state-of-art system, BFT-SMaRt [13]. We then focus on the message cost
for view changes to see our advantages in this scenario.
8.1 Setup
We conducted our experiments on Amazon EC2 using c5.4xlarge instances. Each instance had 16 vCPUs supported
by Intel Xeon Platinum 8000 processors. All cores sustained a Turbo CPU clock speed up to 3.4GHz. We ran each
replica on a single VM instance, and so BFT-SMaRt, which makes heavy use of threads, was allowed to utilize 16
cores per replica, as in their original evaluation [13]. The maximum TCP bandwidth measured by iperf was around
1.2 Gigabytes per second. We did not throttle the bandwidth in any run. The network latency between two machines
was less than 1 ms.
Our prototype implementation of HotStu uses secp256k1 for all digital signatures in both votes and quorum
certicates. BFT-SMaRt uses hmac-sha1 for MACs (Message Authentication Codes) in the messages during normal
operation and uses digital signatures in addition to MACs during a view change.
All results for HotStu reect end-to-end measurement from the clients. For BFT-SMaRt, we used the micro-
benchmark programs ThroughputLatencyServer and ThroughputLatencyClient from the BFT-SMaRt website
(https://github.com/bft-smart/library). The client program measures end-to-end latency but not throughput, while
the server-side program measures both throughput and latency. We used the throughput results from servers and
the latency results from clients.
8.2 Base Performance
We rst measured throughput and latency in a setting commonly seen in the evaluation of other BFT replication
systems. We ran 4 replicas in a conguration that tolerates a single failure, i.e., f = 1, while varying the operation
request rate until the system saturated. This benchmark used empty (zero-sized) operation requests and responses
and triggered no view changes; we expand to other settings below. Although our responsive HotStu is three-phase,
we also run its two-phase variant as an additional baseline, because the BFT-SMaRt baseline has only two phases.
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of batch size, 4 replicas, 0/0 payload.
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Figure 5: Throughput vs. latency with dierent choices
of payload size, 4 replicas, batch size of 400.
Figure 4 depicts three batch sizes for both systems, 100, 400, and 800, though because these systems have dier-
ent batching schemes, these numbers mean slightly dierent things for each system. BFT-SMaRt drives a separate
consensus decision for each operation, and batches the messages from multiple consensus protocols. Therefore, it
has a typical L-shaped latency/throughput performance curve. HotStu batches multiple operations in each node,
and in this way, mitigates the cost of digital signatures per decision. However, above 400 operations per batch, the
latency incurred by batching becomes higher than the cost of the crypto. Despite these dierences, both three-phase
(“HS3-”) and two-phase (“HS2-”) HotStu achieves comparable latency performance to BFT-SMaRt (“BS-”) for all
three batch sizes, while their maximum throughput noticeably outperformed BFT-SMaRt.
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For batch sizes of 100 and 400, the lowest-latency HotStu point provides latency and throughput that are better
than the latency and throughput simultaneously achievable by BFT-SMaRT at its highest throughput, while incurring
a small increase in latency. This increase is partly due to the batching strategy employed by HotStu: It needs three
additional full batches (two in the two-phase variant) to arrive at a decision on a batch. Our experiments kept the
number of outstanding requests high, but the higher the batch size, the longer it takes to ll the batching pipeline.
Practical deployments could be further optimized to adapt the batch size to the number of outstanding operations.
Figure 5 depicts three client request/reply payload sizes (in bytes) of 0/0, 128/128, and 1024/1024, denoted “p0”,
“p128”, and “p1024” respectively. At all payload sizes, both three-phase and two-phase HotStu outperformed BFT-
SMaRt in throughput, with similar or comparable latency.
Notice BFT-SMaRt uses MACs based on symmetric crypto that is orders of magnitude faster than the asymmetric
crypto in digital signatures used by HotStu, and also three-phase HotStu has more round trips compared to two-
phase PBFT variant used by BFT-SMaRt. Yet HotStu is still able to achieve comparable latency and much higher
throughput. Below we evaluate both systems in more challenging situations, where the performance advantages of
HotStu will become more pronounced.
8.3 Scalability
To evaluate the scalability of HotStu in various dimensions, we performed three experiments. For the baseline, we
used zero-size request/response payloads while varying the number of replicas. The second evaluation repeated the
baseline experiment with 128-byte and 1024-byte request/response payloads. The third test repeated the baseline
(with empty payloads) while introducing network delays between replicas that were uniformly distributed in 5ms
± 0.5ms or in 10ms ± 1.0ms, implemented using NetEm (see https://www.linux.org/docs/man8/tc-netem.html). For
each data point, we repeated ve runs with the same setting and show error bars to indicate the standard deviation
for all runs.
The rst setting is depicted in Figure 6a (throughput) and Figure 6b (latency). Both three-phase and two-phase
HotStu show consistently better throughput than BFT-SMaRt, while their latencies are still comparable to BFT-
SMaRt with graceful degradation. The performance scales better than BFT-SMaRt when n < 32. This is because
we currently still use a list of secp256k1 signatures for a QC. In the future, we plan to reduce the cryptographic
computation overhead in HotStu by using a fast threshold signature scheme.
The second setting with payload size 128 or 1024 bytes is denoted by “p128” or “p1024” in Figure 7a (throughput)
and Figure 7b (latency). Due to its quadratic bandwidth cost, the throughput of BFT-SMaRt scales worse than HotStu
for reasonably large (1024-byte) payload size.
The third setting is shown in Figure 8a (throughput) and Figure 8b (latency) as “5ms” or “10ms”. Again, due to
the larger use of communication in BFT-SMaRt, HotStu consistently outperformed BFT-SMaRt in both cases.
8.4 View Change
To evaluate the communication complexity of leader replacement, we counted the number of MAC or signature
verications performed within BFT-SMaRt’s view-change protocol. Our evaluation strategy was as follows. We
injected a view change into BFT-SMaRt every one thousand decisions. We instrumented the BFT-SMaRt source
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Figure 7: Scalability for 128/128 payload or 1024/1024 payload, with batch size of 400.
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Figure 8: Scalability for inter-replica latency 5ms ± 0.5ms or 10ms ± 1.0ms, with 0/0 payload, batch size of 400.
code to count the number of verications upon receiving and processing messages within the view-change protocol.
Beyond communication complexity, this measurement underscores the cryptographic computation load associated
with transferring these authenticated values.
Figure 9a and Figure 9b show the number of extra authenticators (MACs and signatures, respectively) processed
for each view change, where “extra” is dened to be those authenticators that would not be sent if the leader remained
stable. Note that HotStu has no “extra” authenticators by this denition, since the number of authenticators remains
the same regardless of whether the leader stays the same or not. The two gures show that BFT-SMaRt uses cubic
numbers of MACs and quadratic numbers of signatures. HotStu does not require extra authenticators for view
changes and so is omitted from the graph.
Evaluating the real-time performance of leader replacement is tricky. First, BFT-SMaRt got stuck when triggering
frequent view changes; our authenticator-counting benchmark had to average over as many successful view changes
as possible before the system got stuck, repeating the experiment many times. Second, the actual elapsed time
for leader replacement depends highly on timeout parameters and the leader-election mechanism. It is therefore
impossible to provide a meaningful comparison.
9 Conclusion
Since the introduction of PBFT, the rst practical BFT replication solution in the partial synchrony model, numer-
ous BFT solutions were built around its core two-phase paradigm. The rst phase guarantees proposal uniqueness
through a QC. The second phase guarantees that a new leader can convince replicas to vote for a safe proposal. This
requires the leader to relay information from (n−f) replicas, each reporting its own highest QC or vote. Generations
of two-phase works thus suer from a quadratic communication bottleneck on leader replacement.
HotStu revolves around a three-phase core, allowing a new leader to simply pick the highest QC it knows of.
This alleviates the above complexity and at the same time considerably simplies the leader replacement protocol.
Having (almost) canonized the phases, it is very easy to pipeline HotStu, and to frequently rotate leaders.
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A Proof of Safety for Chained HotStu
Theorem 5. Let b and w be two conicting nodes. Then they cannot both become committed, each by an honest replica.
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. By an argument similar to Lemma 1, b and w must be in dier-
ent views. Assume during an exectuion b becomes committed at some honest replica via the QC Three-Chain
b, b′, b′′, b∗, likewise, w becomes committed at some honest replica via the QC Three-Chain w,w′, w′′, w∗. Since
each of b, b′, b′′, w, w′, w′′ get its QC, then w.l.o.g., we assume b is created in a view higher than w′′, namely,
b′.justify .viewNumber > w∗.justify .viewNumber , as shown in Figure 11.
We now denote by vs the lowest view higher than vw′′ = w∗.justify .viewNumber in which there is a qcs such
that qcs.node conicts with w. Let vb = b′.justify .viewNumber . Formally, we dene the following predicate for
any qc:
E(qc) :=(vw′′ < qc.viewNumber ≤ vb) ∧ (qc.node conicts with w).
We can now set the rst switching point qcs:
qcs := arg min
qc
{qc.viewNumber | qc is valid ∧ E(qc)}.
By assumption, such qcs exists, for example, qcs could be b′.justify . Let r denote a correct replica in the in-
tersection of w∗.justify and qcs. By assumption on the minimality of qcs, the lock that r has on w is not changed
before qcs is formed. Now consider the invocation of safeNode in view vs by r, with a message m carrying a
conicting node m.node = qcs.node . By assumption, the condition on the lock (Line 26 in Algorithm 1) is false.
On the other hand, the protocol requires t = m.node.justify .node to be an ancestor of qcs.node . By minimal-
ity of qcs, m.node.justify .viewNumber ≤ vw′′ . Since qcs.node conicts with w, t cannot be w,w′ or w′′. Then,
m.node.justify .viewNumber < w′.justify .viewNumber , so the other half of the disjunct is also false. Therefore, r
will not vote for qcs.node , contradicting the assumption of r.
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The liveness argument is almost identical to Basic HotStu, except that we have to assume after GST, two con-
secutive leaders are correct, to guarantee a decision. It is omitted for brevity.
B Proof of Safety for Implementation Pseudocode
Lemma 6. Let b and w be two conicting nodes such that b.height = w.height , then they cannot both have valid
quorum certicates.
Proof. Suppose they can, so both b and w receive 2f + 1 votes, among which there are at least f + 1 honest replicas
voting for each node, then there must be an honest replica that votes for both, which is impossible because b and w
are of the same height.
Notation 1. For any node b, let “←” denote parent relation, i.e. b.parent ← b. Let “ ∗←” denote ancestry, that is, the
reexive transitive closure of the parent relation. Then two nodes b, w are conicting i. b ∗← w ∧ w ∗← b. Let “⇐”
denote the node a QC refers to, i.e. b.justify .node ⇐ b.
Lemma 7. Let b and w be two conicting nodes. Then they cannot both become committed, each by an honest replica.
Proof. We prove this important lemma by contradiction. Let b and w be two conicting nodes at dierent heights.
Assume during an execution, b becomes committed at some honest replica via the QC Three-Chain b(⇐ ∧ ←
)b′(⇐ ∧ ←)b′′ ⇐ b∗; likewise, w becomes committed at some honest replica via the QC Three-Chain w(⇐ ∧ ←
)w′(⇐ ∧ ←)w′′ ⇐ w∗. By Lemma 1, since each of the nodes b, b′, b′′, w, w′, w′′ have QC’s, then w.l.o.g., we assume
b.height > w′′.height , as shown in Figure 11.
We now denote by qcs the QC for a node with the lowest height larger than w′′.height , that conicts with w.
Formally, we dene the following predicate for any qc:
E(qc) := (w′′.height < qc.node.height ≤ b.height) ∧ (qc.node conicts with w)
We can now set the rst switching point qcs:
qcs := arg min
qc
{qc.node.height | qc is valid ∧ E(qc)}.
By assumption, such qcs exists, for example, qcs could be b′.justify . Let r denote a correct replica in the intersec-
tion of w∗.justify and qcs. By assumption of minimality of qcs, the lock that r has on w is not changed before qcs is
formed. Now consider the invocation of onReceiveProposal, with a message carrying a conicting node bnew such
that bnew = qcs.node . By assumption, the condition on the lock (Line 17 in Algorithm 4) is false. On the other hand,
the protocol requires t = bnew .justify .node to be an ancestor of bnew . By minimality of qcs, t.height ≤ w′′.height .
Since qcs.node conicts withw, t cannot bew,w′ orw′′. Then, t.height < w.height , so the other half of the disjunct
is also false. Therefore, r will not vote for bnew , contradicting the assumption of r.
Theorem 8. Let cmd1 and cmd2 be any two commands where cmd1 is executed before cmd2 by some honest replica,
then any honest replica that executes cmd2 must executes cmd1 before cmd2.
Proof. Denote by w the node that carries cmd1, b carries cmd2. From Lemma 6, it is clear the committed nodes are
at distinct heights. Without loss of generality, assume w.height < b.height . The commit of w are b are triggered by
some onCommit(w′) and onCommit(b′) in update, where w ∗← w′ and b ∗← b′. According to Lemma 7, w′ must
not conict with b′, so w does not conict with b. Then w ∗← b, and when any honest replica executes b, it must rst
executes w by the recursive logic in onCommit.
B.1 Remarks
In order to shed insight on the tradeos taken in the HotStu design, we explain why certain constraints are neces-
sary for safety.
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Why monotonic vheight? Suppose we change the voting rule such that a replica does not need to vote mono-
tonically, as long as it does not vote more than once for each height. The weakened constraint will break safety. For
example, a replica can rst vote for b and then w. Before learning about b′, b′′, it rst delivers w′, w′′, assuming the
lock is on w, and vote for w′′. When it eventually delivers b′′, it will ip to the branch led by b because it is eligible
for locking, and b is higher than w. Finally, the replica will also vote for b′′, causing the commit of both w and b.
Why direct parent? The direct parent constraint is used to ensure the equality b.height > w′′.height used in
the proof, with the help of Lemma 6. Suppose we do not enforce the rule for commit, so the commit constraint is
weakened tow ∗← w′ ∗← w′′ instead ofw ← w′ ← w′′ (same for b). Consider the case wherew′.height < b.height <
b′.height < w′′.height < b′′.height . Chances are, a replica can rst vote for w′′, and then discover b′′ to switch to
the branch by b, but it is too late since w could be committed.
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